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Abstract 
To serve foreign markets, firms can either export or set up a local subsidiary through 
horizontal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The conventional proximity-concentration 
theory suggests that FDI substitutes for trade if distance between countries is large, while 
exports become more important if scale economies in production are large. This paper 
investigates empirically the effect of different dimensions of distance on the choice between 
exports and FDI. We find that different dimensions of distance affect exports and FDI 
differently. There is clear evidence of a proximity-concentration trade-off in geographical 
terms: the share of FDI sales in total foreign sales (exports and FDI sales) increases with 
geographical distance. The positive relation between import tariffs and FDI intensity provides 
further evidence for a trade-off resulting from trade costs. On the other hand, the share of FDI 
decreases with language differences and cultural and institutional barriers. The latter 
dimensions of distance thus affect FDI more strongly than exports.  
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1. Introduction 
To serve foreign markets, firms can either export or set up a local subsidiary through 
horizontal FDI. Brainard (1997) models this decision of firms as a trade-off between 
achieving proximity to local markets (circumventing transport costs), and concentrating 
production in space so as to exploit economies of scale. This is referred to as the proximity-
concentration trade-off. Subsequent empirical analyses in Brainard (1997) and Helpman et al. 
(2004) confirm that local sales associated with FDI increase relative to exports the higher are 
transport costs and other trade barriers, and the lower are investment barriers and scale 
economies at the plant level relative to the corporate level.  
 In the models in Brainard (1997) and Helpman et al. (2004) distance is measured first 
and foremost in terms of transport costs and trade barriers. The proximity-concentration 
model is in essence a model of international trade. It builds on the notion that international 
trade decreases with ‘distance’ as predicted by the gravity model. When distance increases, 
firms will rely relatively more on FDI to access foreign markets. Scale economies are added 
as determinants of FDI. The models pay relatively little attention to the fact that FDI may 
incur costs related to distance of its own.2 Interesting in this context is a thought-provoking 
contribution by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) focuing on apparent puzzles in international 
trade. They underline the importance of intangible barriers, such as incomplete information 
barriers, cultural barriers and institutional barriers, in explaining the persistence of 
‘transactional distance’ between countries. Recently, the trade literature has explicitly 
considered the role of intangible trade barriers in explaining patterns of bilateral trade (e.g., 
Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002, Loungani et al., 2002, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004, 
De Groot et al., 2004). Unlike the mechanisms described by the proximity-concentration 
trade-off, these intangible barriers can affect the costs related to trade as well as FDI.  
 This paper aims to contribute to the discussion on the trade-off between exports and 
FDI by empirically investigating how distance affects the volume of bilateral sales and its 
composition in terms of trade and FDI. We consider different dimensions of distance 
suggested by the literature. Are markets served by exports rather than FDI sales or vice 
versa? Does the choice for a particular mode of entering foreign markets depend on the 
specific dimension of distance that is considered? To answer these questions, we estimate 
gravity equations for bilateral foreign sales (sum of exports and sales related to FDI) and for 
                                               
2
  Brainard does include a language dummy to control for cultural familiarity and a dummy indicating whether a 
country has had a political coup in the last decade to proxy political risk. The share of sales associated with FDI 
(export sales) is increasing (decreasing) in language similarity and decreasing (increasing) in political risk. 
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the share of FDI-sales in bilateral sales (the intensity of FDI). In contrast to previous studies 
(such as Brainard, 1997, Carr et al., 2001, Helpman et al., 2004), in which bilateral FDI data 
for the U.S. are used, we employ OECD data on bilateral FDI. This significantly increases the 
country coverage, and the number of observations on bilateral FDI. 3  The data sample 
includes exports and FDI between OECD countries as well as exports and FDI from OECD 
countries to major non-OECD countries.  
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the relevant 
literature on distance and international interaction. Section 3 describes the data and model 
setup. In Section 4 we present and discuss the regression results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Distance and international interaction 
Distance affects international transactions through various channels. The most obvious 
dimension of distance is physical distance, which reflects transport costs. We divide other 
dimensions of distance between countries into tangible and intangible barriers. Trade policy 
barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers) are examples of tangible barriers to trade. Examples of 
intangible barriers to trade include incomplete information barriers, cultural barriers and 
institutional barriers (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). 
 The literature provides ample evidence for the impact of different dimensions of 
distance on international trade (see, e.g., Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997, Loungani et al., 2002, 
Guiso et al., 2004). The importance of search costs and networks in trade (see, e.g., Rauch, 
1999, 2001) illustrates the importance of information costs for patterns of trade. The effect of 
cultural barriers consists of two aspects, cultural familiarity and cultural distance. Much like 
other sources of incomplete information, unfamiliarity with foreign cultures leads to search 
costs and adjustment costs incurred in international interactions. Familiarity with foreign 
culture is expected to increase if countries share a common language, and to decrease with 
geographical distance. Apart from that, distance in terms of cultural values and norms, causes 
barriers related to trust and understanding (Linders et al., 2005). Institutions influence the 
uncertainty surrounding transactions. The quality of institutions affects expropriation risks, 
the degree of corruption, the enforceability of private contracts, and hence the security of 
trade (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). Controlling for the quality of the governance 
environment in both countries, bilateral trade may be hampered more if the distance between 
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  Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001), and Helpman et al. (2004) all use data on affiliate sales from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The advantage of using affiliate sales is that they are a better measure of 
multinational activity. A drawback of using affiliate sales is that detailed data on the activities of foreign 
affiliates is available for the U.S., but is often sparse or unavailable for other countries.  
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governance systems increases. Hence, two countries that suffer from a high corruption 
incidence may trade more than would be expected on the basis of the quality of their 
respective institutional environments separately (De Groot et al., 2004).  
 Cultural and institutional barriers are relevant for FDI as well (see, e.g., Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1997, Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). These factors determine the cost of doing 
international business as such. Recent empirical studies underline the importance of mutual 
trust, security of trade, and cultural diversity in explaining observed bilateral interactions 
between countries. The results suggest that intangible barriers matter for both exports and 
FDI. The effects of the cultural and institutional variables are commonly significant, even 
with a host of control variables (Guiso et al., 2004). Other findings point out the relevance of 
considering the trade-off between exports and FDI. Linders et al. (2005) find a positive (and 
highly significant) effect of cultural diversity on exports. This result might reflect a 
substitution-effect between exports and FDI: if the costs of cultural distance weigh heavier on 
local presence than on exports, firms substitute exports for sales by local affiliates.  
 
3. Model and Data 
 
3.1 The gravity model of bilateral sales 
The gravity model is the most widely used spatial interaction model to study a variety of 
origin-destination flow phenomena, varying from commuting, telecommunication and asset 
flows, to migration and trade (see Fotheringham and O’Kelly, 1989). It is the workhorse 
model to study patterns of international trade (see Deardorff, 1998, Anderson and Van 
Wincoop, 2003). The gravity model postulates that bilateral trade depends on the economic 
size of the trade partners, which reflects market size and purchasing power, and a variety of 
measures of economic distance (or proximity) between the countries to reflect trade costs.4 
The gravity model has also been used to study bilateral patterns of FDI (see, for instance, 
Eaton and Tamura, 1994, Loungani et al., 2002, Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004, Baltagi et al., 
2007).  
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  The models used in Brainard (1997) and Helpman et al. (2004) preclude an analysis of how size matters for 
trade and FDI. The models include direct measures of scale economies and assume symmetry in factor 
endowments. According to Blonigen (2005), these are models to examine cross-industry differences rather than 
cross-country differences.  
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 In this paper we use the following basic gravity equation to study patterns of bilateral 
foreign sales (sum of exports and sales related to FDI): 
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where Fei denotes bilateral sales. The size of the origin and destination markets is reflected by 
the gross domestic products of the countries of origin and destination (GDP), and by per 
capita incomes (GDPcap). Including GDP per capita is based on the stylized fact in 
international trade that “high-income countries trade disproportionately more with all trading 
partners and not just among themselves, while low-income countries trade less” (Deardorff, 
1998, p.16).  
 The focus in this paper is on four dimensions of distance (distei). We specify distance in 
terms of geography, culture and institutions, and distance caused by import tariffs. To 
measure cultural and institutional distance, we apply an index of distance that was developed 
for these purposes and first applied by Kogut and Singh (1988).5 In addition to cultural 
distance, we control for a shared cultural background by including a dummy variable that 
indicates whether countries share a common language. Apart from a direct measure of 
institutional distance, we also include the quality levels of the institutional environment in the 
country of origin and the country of destination. Transaction costs depend on both the level of 
institutional quality (e.g., contract enforceability and expropriation risk) in both countries and 
the bilateral distance (affecting mutual understanding of and familiarity with informal 
solutions to governance problems). The set of control variables also includes a dummy 
variable that indicates whether or not countries are adjacent in space.  
 We are interested in the effect of the different dimensions of transactional distance on 
the volume of bilateral sales and on the trade-off between its components. Therefore, we 
distinguish two bilateral measures: the volume of bilateral sales (sum of exports and FDI-
sales) and FDI intensity (share of FDI-sales in bilateral sales). To describe the volume of 
bilateral sales, we estimate equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS). For FDI intensity 
as dependent variable, we need to transform the gravity equation, because (by definition) FDI 
                                               
5
  The index is defined as:  
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Here Di,j is the measure of distance between country i and country j, K is the number of indicators of 
culture/institutional quality distinguished  (indexed by k), Ii,k is country i’s score with respect to indicator k, and 
Vk the variance of indicator k over all countries in the sample.  
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intensity ranges between zero and one. We assume that FDI intensity follows a continuous 
logistic function between zero and one, given by: 
 
  
eijj Xei e
S
εβ +−∑+
=
1
1
, (2) 
 
where Sei stands for the share of FDI-sales in bilateral sales, and the Xj’s refer to the same set 
of explanatory variables as in Equation (1). Due to its functional form, the (deterministic) 
expected FDI intensity of bilateral sales and the random outcome are bounded between zero 
and one as well. For this functional form, the effect of a continuous explanatory variable on 
FDI intensity is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the effect of 
changes in variables whose coefficient (β)
 
is negative. An increase in X reduces the FDI 
intensity. On the other hand, when β  is positive, an increase in X increases the FDI intensity 
as is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1. We estimate equation (2) using non-linear least 
squares (NLS). 
 
Figure 1.  FDI intensity as a function of explanatory variables  
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3.2 The Data 
Data on FDI are from the International Direct Investment Statistics database of the OECD.6 
The data represent FDI stocks. To analyse the relative importance of FDI versus exports in 
bilateral foreign sales, we use a proxy for sales associated with FDI.7 The proxy is derived by 
transforming FDI stocks into sales using capital-output ratios.8 Data on capital intensity are 
from the Penn World Tables. Export data are from the UN COMTRADE database for 
bilateral trade. The data sample includes exports and FDI between OECD countries as well as 
exports and FDI from OECD countries to major non-OECD countries, for the period 1984–
1990.9  
 The source of data for GDP and GDP per capita is the Penn World Tables Mark 5.6. 
We use distance in miles between capital cities for geographical distance between countries. 
The data for the indicators of cultural distance are from Hofstede (2001).10 Hofstede (1980, 
2001) has developed a set of variables that reflect national cultures in terms of norms and 
values. These variables are: masculinity (versus femininity); uncertainty avoidance; 
individualism (versus collectivism); and power distance. Each is constructed on the basis of 
principal components analysis, and intends to reflect the stance of a distinct set of work-
related norms and values in national cultures. Data on indicators of institutional quality are 
from Kaufmann et al. (2005). Kaufmann et al. (2005) have constructed six indicators of 
perceived institutional quality on the basis of principal components analysis. These indicators 
are: voice and accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; 
rule of law; control of corruption. The institutional quality score of a country is calculated by 
taking the simple average of the scores across all six governance indicators. Data on 
adjacency and common language are from CEPII. As an indicator of tangible trade barriers, 
                                               
6
  The data on FDI and GDP (see below) are those from Blonigen et al. (2003). The data were kindly provided 
by Bruce Blonigen.   
7
  Comparison of data on affiliate sales from the BEA and our measures of FDI-related sales for the U.S. shows 
high levels of correlation: for 1990, these are equal to 0.99 or 0.90 in the case of inward FDI sales, and 0.85 or 
0.92 for outward sales, depending on whether the capital-output ratio of the parent country or the host country is 
used. 
8
  We have used the capital-output ratio of destination countries to transform FDI stocks into sales related to 
FDI, the idea being that output from FDI is determined foremost by the characteristics of the local market. Still, 
one may also argue that it is the technology and/or management techniques of the parent firm (origin country) 
that determine output. In this case one would apply the capital-output ratio of the country of origin. Both 
methods yield similar estimation results (available on request).  
9
  The data period largely conforms to Blonigen et al. (2003), for the sake of comparison. Without changing the 
results qualitatively, we have omitted the years 1982-1983 and 1991-1992 from our sample due to a lack of 
observations. Although FDI has increased rapidly in the last two decades in particular, we may assume that the 
(marginal) effects of distance on trade and FDI are more or less constant over time. For instance, the effect of 
(geographic) distance on trade is shown to be persistent over time despite falling costs of transport and 
communication (see, e.g., Disdier and Head, 2008, Linders, 2006).   
10
  Supplemented with additional countries (Linders et al., 2005). 
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we use trade-weighted applied tariffs from the WITS data set. Further information on the 
variables used in this paper, descriptive statistics and correlations for our data sample are 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
This section presents the results from estimating gravity equations for bilateral foreign sales 
and for the share of FDI-sales.  
 
4.1. The gravity model of total bilateral sales and FDI intensity 
The first specification in Table 1 presents the results for the basic model of bilateral sales, 
given in equation (1). The results indicate that the patterns of bilateral sales are explained 
fairly well by the gravity equation. The effect size for the traditional gravity model variables, 
GDP and geographical distance, is comparable to the standard findings in empirical studies of 
bilateral trade patterns (see Frankel, 1997, Disdier and Head, 2008, Linders et al., 2008). 
Total sales increase with both the GDP of the origin and the destination country, and fall with 
geographical distance. Following the stylized fact that high-income countries trade more 
(Deardorff, 1998), we included GDP per capita of the origin and destination countries in the 
gravity equation for total bilateral sales. The statement by Deardorff receives some empirical 
support from our estimates of the basic model. Except for per capita income of the country of 
origin, all variables in the base model are highly statistically significant. 
 The results for FDI intensity are given in column (2). First, we find clear evidence of a 
conventional proximity-concentration trade-off in geographical terms. FDI intensity increases 
with geographical distance and this effect is highly statistically significant. Regarding the 
other traditional gravity equation variables, we can see that the country of origin is relatively 
more involved in FDI-related sales if its GDP level is higher. In contrast, the GDP in the 
destination country does not appear to affect the composition of bilateral sales.11 A possible 
explanation is that the share of highly productive firms tends to be higher in larger 
economies, because of scale advantages at the firm level that can be exploited on the 
domestic market. Because highly productive companies are more likely to engage in FDI 
(see, e.g., Helpman et al., 2004), FDI would respond elastically to GDP in the parent country. 
A similar reasoning may explain why GDP per capita in the parent country is important in 
                                               
11
  These findings are consistent with the existing literature on FDI. See, for example, Bergstrand and Egger 
(2007, p. 296) who note that ‘typical FDI gravity equation estimates find home country GDP elasticities 
significantly larger than host country GDP elasticities’. 
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explaining the trade-off between FDI and exports. If only the most productive of firms that 
engage in international transactions become established as multinational corporations, a high 
average income and productivity is likely to yield relatively more FDI-related sales. 
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Table 1. Estimation results 
 Basic model Culture, institutions and bilateral tariffs Fixed effects 
 Log Total sales FDI intensity Log Total sales FDI intensity Log Total sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log GDP exporter 0.90*** 0.14*** 1.02*** 0.36***  
 (37.99) (4.72) (40.36) (10.35)  
Log GDP importer 0.76*** 0.02 0.86*** 0.02  
 (35.12) (0.74) (36.02) (0.47)  
Log GDP/cap exporter 0.10 1.62*** –1.23*** –0.44  
 (0.90) (8.56) (7.92) (1.64)  
Log GDP/cap importer 0.72*** 0.17*** –0.03 0.08  
 (18.06) (3.28) (0.37) (0.65)  
Log Distance –0.70*** 0.14*** –0.59*** 0.10*** –0.68*** 
 (29.83) (4.65) (23.35) (2.84) (21.55) 
Language dummy   0.51*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 
   (6.79) (5.46) (6.75) 
Adjacency   0.42*** –0.51*** 0.41*** 
   (5.24) (4.48) (5.92) 
Cultural distance   –0.03* –0.14*** –0.09*** 
   (1.79) (4.93) (5.19) 
Inst. quality exporter   0.83*** 1.53***  
   (8.90) (8.31)  
Inst. quality importer   0.63*** 0.29**  
   (7.13) (2.13)  
Inst. distance   0.02 0.04 0.10** 
   (0.53) (0.75) (2.39) 
Log(1+Tariff)   –3.79*** 2.54** –4.80*** 
   (5.25) (2.13) (3.59) 
Constant –15.29*** –20.59*** –1.62 –5.60** 12.31*** 
 (14.29) (11.62) (1.27) (2.70) (26.01) 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.89 
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Specifications for FDI 
intensity are estimated using nonlinear least squares. Specifications for total sales are estimated with standard OLS. Columns 1-4: year dummies included (not shown). 
Column 5 includes importer-year and exporter-year specific dummies. Data cover the period 1984–1990. 
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4.2. The multiple dimensions of distance  
We now turn to the main question in this paper, i.e. how transaction costs that arise from 
different dimensions of distance affect the volume and composition of bilateral sales. Column 
(3) in Table 1 presents the estimation results for total bilateral sales volumes.12 Column (4) 
reports the outcomes for FDI intensity. Specification (5), for total bilateral sales, includes 
year-specific fixed effects for country of origin and country of destination and is included to 
assess robustness for a number of our dimensions of distance. The fixed-effects specification 
is in line with theoretical concerns about omitted variables in the gravity equation for exports 
(see Feenstra, 2004). The disadvantage, though, is that country-specific regressors cannot be 
included because of the fixed effects. This implies, for example, that this specification cannot 
assess the effect of the level of institutional quality in both origin and destination. 
 As shown in column (3), the gravity equation again performs quite well in explaining 
total bilateral foreign sales. The sum of exports and FDI sales depends negatively on 
geographical distance, as before, although the magnitude of distance decay falls when we add 
other dimensions of proximity or distance affecting transactions. The sign of the effect of 
most dimensions of distance (language, adjacency, cultural distance, institutional quality and 
import tariffs) is as one would expect, given the impact we a-priori believe they have on 
transaction costs.  
 Bilateral sales decrease with cultural distance. 13  Although the effect of distance in 
cultural norms and values is statistically significant only at the 10% level in specification (3), 
the estimate is statistically more significant in the fixed-effects regression. Next, we turn to 
institutional quality and institutional distance. Institutional quality positively and significantly 
affects bilateral interaction. This reflects that better institutions reduce transaction costs. The 
estimated effect of institutional distance does not support our ex-ante expectations, neither in 
the extended model (3), nor in the fixed effects specification (5). We would expect bilateral 
sales to increase if institutional environments are more similar between countries. In the 
fixed-effects estimation, the effect of institutional distance on bilateral sales is significantly 
positive. This finding is contrary to estimates for bilateral trade previously found in the 
                                               
12
  We have also disentangled bilateral sales, and estimated gravity equations for exports and FDI-sales. The 
results are presented separately in Appendix B. Because we have used data on FDI stocks to compute FDI-sales, 
we also present gravity equation estimates for FDI stocks there. 
13
  Cultural distance is estimated to have a positive effect on exports and a negative effect on FDI (see Table B1 
in Appendix B). These results suggest that cultural distance is of particular importance to FDI and that firms 
substitute exports for FDI when cultural distance increases. Nevertheless, in a specification with full country-
specific fixed effects, the effect of cultural distance is negative for both exports and FDI alike. Thus, the results 
no longer provide evidence for the substitution (in absolute terms) of FDI by exports. Rather, they are consistent 
with a trade-off in relative terms. 
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literature, and may be related to the nature of the sample in our analysis. The set of origin 
countries only consists of 12 OECD countries, while destination countries include both 
OECD and non-OECD countries. Low institutional distance applies to trade between OECD 
countries, and high institutional distance to trade between OECD and non-OECD countries. 
This explains why institutional distance and destination country institutional quality are 
highly correlated in our sample (see Table A2). Since flows originating from countries with 
relatively low institutional quality are lacking from this sample, it may be difficult to capture 
the effect of institutional distance (as separate from institutional quality). 
 The results in column (3) of Table 1 seem at odds with the stylized fact on the role of 
GDP per capita in bilateral sales. Per capita income of the origin country has a negative and 
significant effect on bilateral sales. This suggests that more developed countries engage less 
in outward bilateral sales, all else equal. The level of development of the destination country 
has no significant impact on bilateral sales. Despite the stylized facts quoted by Deardorff, the 
theoretical literature that underpins the gravity equation does not predict any relation between 
the level of development and total bilateral export. In fact, GDP per capita may proxy for 
omitted variables such as institutional quality that are highly correlated to it. It is quite 
common to find an insignificant or negative effect of per capita income on bilateral trade once 
institutional effectiveness is controlled for (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002, De Groot et al., 
2004). A negative effect may reflect that, when countries become wealthier, the share of total 
expenditure devoted to traded goods falls, because the structure of production and 
consumption shifts from commodities towards services.14  
 With respect to FDI intensity, we see that the extension into multiple dimensions of 
distance supplements the conventional proximity-concentration trade off. The relative 
importance of FDI increases with geographical distance, as before. The results also strongly 
indicate a shift from exports to FDI if tariff barriers increase. This supports the conventional 
proximity-concentration trade off.15  
                                               
14
  As FDI stocks include the service sector, it is not as straightforward to explain why FDI is negatively related 
to income per capita of the parent country, having controlled for institutional quality. A possible explanation 
could be found in composition effects of FDI. This would hold if, when per capita income rises, a decline in 
bilateral manufacturing FDI relative to GDP tends to outweigh a concomitant increase in services FDI. 
15
  The results in Appendix B, where export and FDI sales are disentangled, show a relative trade-off; both FDI 
sales and exports negatively depend on distance and tariffs, but the elasticity is higher for trade. In fact, FDI 
sales only show a statistically weak decline if tariffs rise, indicating a possibly substantial substitution of exports 
by FDI sales in the face of high tariff barriers (see, e.g., Carr et al., 2001, Markusen, 2002). For comparison, 
Brainard (1997) finds a positive coefficient of trade barriers on the level of affiliate sales, even though she notes 
that, strictly speaking, the proximity-concentration hypothesis applies to shares rather than to levels of affiliate 
sales and trade. Carr et al. (2001) also predict and find a positive effect of trade costs in the host country on the 
level of affiliate sales. 
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 The results furthermore indicate that the relative importance of FDI sales increases as 
the quality of institutions in both the parent and host country increases. The effect of 
institutional quality of the parent country is particularly large. This may reflect that only the 
most productive firms engage in FDI which are likely to be found only in high-quality 
institutional environments (Helpman et al., 2004).  
 As a robustness check, we also estimated specifications including absolute per capita 
GDP differentials to control for factor-proportions and preference differences (cf. Brainard, 
1997). Our results suggest that countries with similar levels of income trade and invest more 
amongst each other. This provides support for the Linder (1961) hypothesis that similarity in 
income promotes bilateral sales. However, the support for this result is statistically weak. Per 
capita GDP similarities turn out to be relatively more important for FDI, a result that mirrors 
previous findings in Brainard (1997). However, the statistical significance of this finding is 
low. The results do not affect other findings qualitatively, and are available on request.  
 
Robustness using only cross-sectional variation   
The results presented above are obtained from a panel data set. The use of panel data 
generally yields more efficient estimators than cross-sectional or time series data because data 
vary over two dimensions, countries and time (see, e.g., Verbeek, 2002). Nevertheless, the 
weaker the time-series variation in bilateral trade and FDI, the closer we are to merely 
running a series of cross-sections.16 Significance levels (standard errors) of the regression 
coefficients may then be overstated (understated) due to dependence of observations over 
time. In this subsection we therefore examine the specifications of total sales and FDI 
intensity using purely cross-sectional data. This is done by averaging the variables over time. 
The results are given in Table 2.  
 
                                               
16
  Lankhuizen (2009) shows that the data are clustered by exporter and importer countries, and exporter-
importer combinations.  
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Table 2. Results from cross-section  
 
Culture, institutions and bilateral tariffs 
 
Log Total sales                FDI intensity 
 
(1) (2) 
Log GDP exporter 0.95*** 0.41*** 
 
(18.03) (5.72) 
Log GDP importer 0.87*** 0.03    
 
(16.33) (0.38) 
Log GDP per capita exporter –0.97*** –0.33    
 
(2.99) (0.54) 
Log GDP per capita importer –0.12 0.07    
 
(0.66) (0.24) 
Log Distance –0.60*** 0.06    
 
(10.69) (0.75) 
Language dummy 0.39** 0.48**    
 
(2.27) (2.47) 
Adjacency 0.50*** –0.51**    
 
(2.78) (2.03) 
Cultural distance –0.05 –0.15**    
 
(1.40) (2.31) 
Institutional quality exporter 0.79*** 1.61***    
 
(3.71) (3.59) 
Institutional quality importer 0.77*** 0.35    
 
(4.26) (1.12) 
Institutional distance 0.05 0.05     
 
(0.84) (0.38) 
Log(1+Tariff) –3.56** 3.69    
 
(2.33) (1.30) 
Constant –2.23 –7.25    
 
(0.83) (1.48) 
Observations 223 223 
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.75 
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. Starts indicate statistical significance: * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
 
The table indicates that t-statistics (standard errors) of all variables are generally lower 
(higher) in the cross-section estimation. In a few cases, coefficients are no longer statistically 
significant.17 Nevertheless, the sign patterns and coefficient sizes are qualitatively robust. 
 
Discussion  
We find that different dimensions of distance affect exports and FDI differently. As a result, 
some destinations are served relatively heavily through exports and others more through sales 
from FDI. The share of FDI sales increases with geographical distance. As geographical 
distance increases so do transport costs. Total foreign sales (exports and sales related to FDI) 
                                               
17
  In particular, this pertains to the effect of cultural distance on total sales and the effects of geographical 
distance, institutional quality of the importer and bilateral tariffs on FDI intensity.  
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fall with geographical distance, but it constitutes a bigger cost for exports than FDI. On the 
other hand, ‘soft’ barriers, i.e. language, culture and institutions, are particularly important for 
FDI. This can be explained from the fact that local presence entails a relatively deep 
involvement with and exposure to local cultures and institutions. Also, the demands in terms 
of language are higher for operating a plant in a foreign market compared to exporting.  
 To interpret the economic significance for FDI intensity of the coefficients in column 
(4) in Table 1, we use typical values of the explanatory variables in the sample. Table 3 gives 
the expected value of FDI intensity for the minimum and maximum values, the sample mean 
and the mean plus (minus) one standard deviation, for each of the explanatory variables fixing 
all other explanatory variables to their sample mean.  
 
Table 3.  Economic significance of parameter estimates: FDI intensity  
 
Min. –1 St. Dev. Mean +1 Std. Dev. Max. 
Log GDP exporter 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.51 
Log GDP importer 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 
Log GDP per capita exporter 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 
Log GDP per capita importer 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 
Log Distance 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.37 
Language dummy 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.43 
Adjacency 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.24 
Cultural distance 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.20 
Institutional quality exporter 0.12 0.23 0.34 0.46 0.49 
Institutional quality importer 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.38 
Institutional distance 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 
Log(1+ Tariff) 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.51 
Note: the numbers indicate the value of FDI intensity for typical values of the explanatory variables in our 
sample, fixing all other variables to their sample mean. ‘Min.’ and ‘Max.’ denote the minimum and maximum 
values in the sample; ‘–1 (+1) Std. Dev.’ denote –1 (+1) standard deviation from the sample mean.  
 
 
Our results illustrate that FDI does not merely substitute for trade when transport costs and 
trade barriers are high: FDI sales incur costs of their own. Table 3 indicates that, for example, 
increasing cultural distance by one standard deviation from its sample mean ceteris paribus 
reduces the share of FDI sales in total foreign sales (FDI plus exports) by 5 percentage points. 
Similarly, an increase in institutional quality of the parent and the host country by one 
standard deviation from their sample mean increases the share of FDI sales by 12 and 4 
percentage points, respectively. For comparison, the effects of our ‘soft’ dimensions of 
transactional distance on the trade-off between exports and FDI are comparable to, and 
sometimes more substantial, than the effects of the traditional proximity-concentration control 
variables. An increase in geographical distance by one standard deviation from its sample 
mean increases the share of FDI sales by 2 percentage points. A one standard deviation 
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increase in bilateral import tariffs increases the share of FDI sales by 3 percentage points. For 
comparison of their quantitative effects on FDI intensity, we can express changes in 
intangible barriers as tariff equivalents (similar to Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). A 
decrease in cultural distance of one standard deviation is equivalent to an 8 percentage point 
increase of the average bilateral tariff. The tariff equivalents of an increase in institutional 
quality of the parent and the host country of one standard deviation are 22 and 7%-points, 
respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To serve foreign markets, firms can either export or set up a local subsidiary through 
horizontal FDI. According to the proximity-concentration trade-off (Brainard, 1997, Helpman 
et al., 2004) local sales associated with FDI increase relative to exports the higher are 
transport costs and trade barriers and the lower are investment barriers and scale economies at 
the plant level relative to the corporate level.  
 In this paper, we extend the framework for analysing the trade-off between exports and 
FDI empirically. We investigate the effect of various dimensions of distance on the 
composition of total bilateral interaction, viz. geographical distance and distance in economic 
terms due to tangible trade barriers such as tariffs and intangible barriers such as cultural and 
institutional differences between countries. Unlike the conventional proximity-concentration 
trade-off our approach explicitly takes into account that intangible barriers affect the fixed and 
variable costs related to FDI as well and may affect the trade-off between exports and FDI 
differentially. 
 We show that different dimensions of distance affect exports and FDI differently. First, 
there is clear evidence in support of a conventional proximity-concentration trade-off. The 
share of FDI sales increases with both geographical distance and import tariffs. On the other 
hand, this paper illustrates that FDI does not merely substitute for trade when transport costs 
and trade barriers are high. It incurs costs of its own. These costs are primarily of an 
intangible nature. The share of FDI in total bilateral sales decreases with language differences 
and cultural distance, and increases with institutional quality in both the parent and host 
country. Hence, ‘soft’ barriers are particularly important for FDI. Our results, though, do not 
offer robust support for a negative effect of institutional distance on either trade or FDI.  
 Finally, our results indicate that larger economies engage relatively more in outward 
FDI, while the size of the foreign market affects exports and FDI by and large equally. This 
may be interpreted to provide support for the argument that only relatively high-productivity 
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firms are active on the export market and the most productive firms become multinational 
firms by investing abroad. On the other hand, per capita income, as a measure of productivity, 
does not have a statistically positive effect on the FDI intensity of bilateral sales. This reflects 
that high-income countries tend to have less bilateral interaction both inward and outward, 
once we control for the effect of institutional quality. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix provides details of data definitions and sources used in this paper.  
 
Variable  Indicators 
Tij  Exports from country i  to j. Source: UN COMTRADE database for 
bilateral trade. Panel 1982-1992. 
 
FDIij OECD outward FDI stock in millions of real U.S. dollars. Panel 1982-
1992. Source: International Direct Investment Statistics database of the 
OECD. 
 
FDI sales (Value of FDI stock) * GDP/K.  
 
GDP Real GDP constructed from Penn World Tables 5.6. 
 
K  Capital stock constructed from Penn World Tables 5.6.  
 
Cultural distance Kogut-Singh index of four dimensions of national culture identified by 
Hofstede (1980, 2001).  
 
Institutional quality Average of six governance indicators from Kaufmann (2005).  
 
Institut’l distance Kogut-Singh index of six governance indicators from Kaufmann 
(2005). Data are for 1996.  
 
Adjacency Dummy indicating adjacency. Source: CEPII. 
 
Language dummy Dummy indicating whether two countries share a common official 
language. Source: CEPII. 
 
Distance  Distance between capital cities (in miles). Source: CEPII. 
 
Tariffs  Trade-weighted applied tariffs. Tariffs are for 1999. Source: WITS. 
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Table A1 presents the set of origin and destination countries in the estimation sample.  
 
Table A1. Countries in sample  
Origin (OECD) Destination countries (OECD and non-OECD) 
 
Australia Argentina Ireland Switzerland 
Austria  Australia Italy Turkey 
Canada  Austria Japan UK 
France Belgium/Luxembourg Korea USA 
Italy Canada Mexico Venezuela 
Japan Chile The Netherlands 
 
Korea Colombia Norway 
 
The Netherlands Denmark New Zealand 
 
Norway Finland Philippines 
 
Sweden France Portugal 
 
UK Greece Spain 
 
USA India Sweden 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample are given in Table A2. 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Log Exports 14.12 1.61 5.74 18.39 1145 
Log FDI stock 6.25 2.40 –1.18 11.92 1145 
Log FDI sales 6.17 2.41 –1.26 11.98 1145 
Log total foreign sales 7.75 1.63 2.59 12.44 1145 
FDI intensity 0.34 0.25 0.00 1.00 1145 
Log GDP exporter 13.31 1.19 11.03 15.32 1145 
Log GDP importer 12.25 1.25 10.13 15.32 1145 
Log GDP per capita exporter 9.50 0.22 8.53 9.80 1145 
Log GDP per capita importer 9.12 0.63 6.92 9.80 1145 
Log absolute diff. GDP per capita 0.51 0.57 0.00 2.78 1145 
Log Distance 8.25 1.14 5.16 9.88 1145 
Language dummy 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1145 
Adjacency 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 1145 
Cultural distance 2.20 1.47 0.02 7.44 1145 
Institutional quality exporter 1.47 0.35 0.59 1.90 1145 
Institutional quality importer 1.25 0.65 –0.46 1.93 1145 
Institutional distance 0.74 1.04 0.02 5.43 1145 
Log (1 + tariff) 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.31 1145 
 
 
Table A3 gives the correlation matrix for the data used in the estimation samples. 
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Table A3. Correlation matrix (N=1145) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1. Log Exports 1                  
2. Log FDI stock 0.69 1                 
3. Log FDI sales 0.68 0.99 1                
4. Log tot foreign sales 0.93 0.86 0.86 1               
5. FDI intensity 0.02 0.67 0.69 0.35 1              
6. Log GDP exporter 0.28 0.41 0.42 0.36 0.31 1             
7. Log GDP importer 0.51 0.31 0.33 0.50 0.02 –0.10 1            
8. Log GDP cap exp 0.06 0.33 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.36 –0.08 1           
9. Log GDP cap imp 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.37 0.02 –0.20 0.19 0.01 1          
10. Log abs diff. GDPcap –0.29 –0.23 –0.17 –0.27 0.03 0.25 –0.06 0.06 –0.91 1         
11. Log Distance –0.32 –0.11 –0.08 –0.23 0.22 0.36 0.14 0.12 –0.21 0.31 1        
12. Language dummy 0.10 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.06 0.03 0.22 –0.02 0.09 0.07 1       
13.Adjacency  0.34 0.20 0.19 0.30 –0.09 –0.04 0.03 0.02 0.13 –0.15 –0.43 0.24 1      
14. Cultural distance –0.12 –0.26 –0.25 –0.18 –0.23 –0.03 –0.08 –0.08 –0.20 0.22 0.00 –0.41 –0.23 1     
15. Inst. quality exp –0.05 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.28 –0.22 –0.01 0.58 0.07 –0.06 –0.17 0.20 0.00 0.07 1    
16. Instit quality imp 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.07 –0.15 –0.12 0.01 0.81 –0.75 –0.22 0.09 0.06 –0.17 0.06 1   
17. Instit distance –0.19 –0.19 –0.15 –0.19 –0.06 0.12 0.07 –0.01 –0.61 0.66 0.16 –0.02 –0.05 0.28 –0.05 –0.78 1  
18. Log (1 + tariff) –0.28 –0.19 –0.14 –0.23 0.07 0.20 0.14 –0.05 –0.70 0.70 0.45 0.05 –0.16 0.03 –0.17 –0.64 0.54 1 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Background regressions: Exports, FDI stocks and Sales associated with FDI  
 Culture, institutions and bilateral tariffs Adding per capita GDP differences Fixed effects 
 Exports FDI stocks FDI sales Exports FDI stocks FDI sales Exports FDI stocks FDI sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log GDP exporter 0.88*** 1.48*** 1.48*** 0.88*** 1.49*** 1.49***    
 (35.06) (31.12) (29.68) (34.78) (31.25) (29.91)    
Log GDP importer 0.87*** 0.80*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.92***    
 (37.06) (18.91) (19.83) (38.75) (18.66) (19.70)    
Log GDP cap exporter –0.94*** –1.44*** –1.43*** –0.93*** –1.39*** –1.37***    
 (5.48) (4.49) (4.27) (5.53) (4.23) (3.97)    
Log GDP cap importer –0.13 0.30* –0.12 –0.24** –0.09 –0.60**    
 (1.53) (1.77) (0.68) (2.46) (0.32) (2.18)    
Log Distance –0.65*** –0.58*** –0.58*** –0.65*** –0.56*** –0.56*** –0.73*** –0.72*** –0.72*** 
 (27.82) (11.15) (10.71) (26.68) (10.48) (9.99) (20.67) (11.84) (11.84) 
Language dummy 0.30*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.31*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.23*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
 (4.56) (6.34) (5.94) (4.65) (6.50) (6.16) (4.06) (4.82) (4.82) 
Adjacency 0.63*** 0.12 0.08 0.63*** 0.12 0.09 0.57*** 0.22 0.22 
 (8.01) (0.72) (0.50) (7.99) (0.75) (0.54) (8.77) (1.52) (1.52) 
Cultural distance 0.03 –0.24*** –0.25*** 0.03* –0.24*** –0.25*** –0.09*** –0.20*** –0.20*** 
 (1.58) (5.47) (5.47) (1.68) (5.34) (5.32) (4.54) (4.78) (4.78) 
Inst. quality exp. 0.21* 2.55*** 2.55*** 0.21* 2.54*** 2.54***    
 (1.96) (11.68) (11.34) (1.95) (11.63) (11.31)    
Inst. quality imp. 0.56*** 0.84*** 1.00*** 0.58*** 0.94*** 1.13***    
 (7.87) (5.12) (5.79) (8.31) (5.41) (6.19)    
Inst. distance 0.00 0.13* 0.12* 0.02 0.18** 0.19** 0.16*** 0.05 0.05 
 (0.03) (1.88) (1.65) (0.42) (2.42) (2.37) (2.84) (0.61) (0.61) 
Log (1+Tariff) –5.75*** –2.25 –2.06 –5.79*** –2.37 –2.22 –7.27*** 2.75 2.75 
 (6.49) (1.43) (1.24) (6.57) (1.50) (1.33) (4.94) (1.10) (1.10) 
Abs diff. Log GDPcap    –0.12 –0.42* –0.53**    
    (1.10) (1.85) (2.20)    
Constant 6.22*** –11.92*** –9.51*** 6.90*** –9.49*** –6.46** 19.40*** 10.67*** 10.64*** 
 (5.00) (4.35) (3.33) (4.47) (3.45) (2.26) (38.34) (13.33) (13.30) 
Observations 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 1145 
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.65 0.62 0.79 0.65 0.62 0.87 0.83 0.83 
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical significance: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Specifications for FDI intensity are estimated using nonlinear least squares. Specifications for total sales are estimated with standard OLS. Columns 1-4: year 
dummies included (not shown). Column 5 includes importer-year and exporter-year specific dummies. Data cover the period 1984–1990. 
